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ABSTRACT
The City of Boston is in the midst of a centralization
plan for information systems as a result of several manage-
ment consulting reports. It is acquiring new hardware and
software to implement such a change. We present Boston as
a case study and examine the applicability of centralization
for the information services of the city using guidelines
developed in the literature. Of particular interest are
the possible impacts on, and constraints imposed by the
government organizational structure which has had a signi-
ficant effect on the way the decision to centralize has been
made and carried out. We conclude the decision is ill-advised
in many respects and recommend alternatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I.1 Purpose
The issue of centralization vs. decentralization of
information systems has enjoyed a long and lively life, and
shows no sign of diminished vigor. On the contrary, with
the advent of minicomputers and advances in networking which
allow distributed processing and data bases, the question
has regained currency and an extensive literature has grown
up. A useful guide to some of this material is available
in two Center for Information Systems Research (CISR) work-
ing papers by Rockart and Leventer (12,13), which summarize
most of the seminal research undertaken thus far.
Our primary purpose is to present the city of Boston as
a case study and examine the applicability of centralization
for the information services of the city. We will be es-
pecially wary of the possible impacts on, and constraints
imposed by, the government organizational structure. As
we shall see this has had a significant effect on the way
the decision to centralize has been made and carried out.
Boston has had an informal plan to centralize ("con-
solidate" is their term for it) information services since
1968, with impetus added three years ago by a consulting
report issued by Clasby Associates, which recommended cen-
tralization of hardware. As part of this on-going effort,
-6-
the central data processing group upgraded its previous IBM
370/145 to a 158 this past March and is presently search-
ing for a suitable software package for adding a personnel
system to replace the current manual one. By this fall,
much processing that is common among city departments (pay-
rolls, personnel, etc.) will have been moved onto the central
computer at City Hall, as will many specialized applications.
The setting provided by the city is quite different from
that of private industry, with perhaps the closest semblance
to it in the recent literature being that of the multi-campus
public college study by Demb(3). Nevertheless, many of the
same reasons for the continued importance to corporate manag-
ers of the C/D issue, are equally applicable to the case of.
city government. These include the need to make maximum use
of a costly resource and to avoid conflicts arising from
attempts to centralize. Further, it has been argued that
control of the information systems function is perceived to
be synonymous with political power in the organization. In
the context of City Hall this phrase takes on a doubly rich
meaning.
The centralization/decentralization decision is of con-
siderable complexity, involving such considerations as cost
and effectiveness, and the structural characteristics, phi-
losophies and objectives of the organization. This complex-
ity makes it difficult for a single approach to illuminate
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all facets of the decision simultaneously. In our opinion,
as important as hardware costs may be, a centralization
decision based solely on this criterion is ignoring much
more important ones such as whether the system design can
be meshed with the formal and informal procedures, attitudes
and personalities. As hardware costs plummet, economies
of scale have less impact; as minicomputers improve, many
more hardware configurations become viable from a technical
viewpoint. The trend therefore is for more of the soft,
qualitative factors to come to the fore. Theseefactors
are many and often conflicting.
Our secondary purpose therefore is to test the useful-
ness of the CISR decision model for C/D. We feel that it
can be a helpful adjunct in structuring the decision, es-
pecially as it was evident from the start that it was the
non-technical considerations which were the major forces
to be reckoned with in the city.
1.2 Perspective
Before getting more deeply involved we must clarify
our frame of reference regarding data processing for the
city. There does not exist a sharp boundary between cen-
tralized and decentralized information systems, but rather
a continuum. For this reason the structure of DP in the
city may be viewed in several ways, and according to the
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view we may argue alternatively that it is already central-
ized and decentralized and also that it may be moving toward
one or the other. We must therefore first agree upon our
starting point.
We shall see that as far as responsibility and power
are concerned, the city is strongly decentralized along de-
partmental lines. A number of departments, both of the pub-
lic service and the administrative type, have maintained
their own DP units for at least a decade, and during this
time there has been very little interaction between the
separate groups. Each has been concerned with its own de-
partment's needs. Therefore we may characterize them as
a whole as decentralized. However, if we take a finer look
at the units within departments we reach a different conclu-
sion.
The Police DP group, for instance, has its equipment
and staff at one central location; it is therefore strongly
centralized in its role of servicing the Police department.
However, it has recently developed a minicomputer system
for computer-aided dispatching and several interactive
applications. With each BPD patrol car in continuous con-
tact with dispatchers we see that DP is now much more acces-
sible to previously untouched areas; we can envision the
next logical step in which each car carries a remote mobile
terminal interacting directly with the computer.
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Similarly at Health & Hospitals we find a central hard-
ware and staff facility but also an active effort to develop
and distribute interactive systems throughout the user com-
munity. Programmable data loggers with auto-analyzer inter-
faces have been set up at clinical locations which communicate
with a DEC mini. We may therefore say there is at least
a movement in the direction of distributed processing.
On the other hand Administrative Services DP handles
the data processing needs for a number of divisions lacking
this capability, especially those within City Hall itself.
It has additionally, since its inception, been the facility
designated to be the central unit. It may be viewed as
centralized on a department level as the others, or it may
be considered to be a "supernode" on a level above and dis-
tinct from the other DP units.
We shall take the macro-view, namely that DP is decen-
tralized among the departments. We shall regard Administra-
tive Services DP as the prospective central DP since there
is still a substantial amount of processing and expenditures
arising in other departments; and we shall examine the city's
stated purpose of consolidation, even if its actions do not
always match its words. We shall keep in mind, however, that
within departments DP is centralized and there is some tend-
ency for it to move outwards towards greater user contact.
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1.3 Plan and Preview
The major theme which runs throughout is the conviction
that regardless of the configuration chosen it is imperative
that planning for the DP function be conducted on both a
city-wide and a department-wide basis. We feel this way
for the following reason.
It is a fact of life that plans become obsolete. This
may occur because of faulty forecasts, or because they do
not take into account changing aspirations or the unexpected.
Therefore while decisions may be crucial, plans are not in-
herently crucial; but the process of planning is. A plan
should be conceived at the outset as something which will
and should change. In other words planning is a continuous
process during which events will take place, objectives will
be realized, projects will be completed, but the process
will continue. It shall become evident that this is not
happening for the city. It is pursuing a plan based on yes-
terday's data, yesterday's concept of what is correct. It
is ignoring today's data which would show its plan to be
weak and is positioning itself to do the same with tomorrow's.
We intend to pursue this theme via a two-fold approach.
First we shall examine the process by which the city arrived
at its consolidation plan and point out the many instances
where the plan ignored or overlooked current realities.
Secondly we present a framework for making the C/D decision
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which we feel does conform to the tenets of the above view
and will examine its specific recommendations.
It is appropriate here to set out three basic assump-
tions which we feel underlie improved decision-making in
the city government. While these may appear too obvious
to deserve mention, we will see that no matter how obvious
these assumptions are, they seem not to have penetrated
or influenced things very much in practice.
1. Decisions are likely to be better if we know what
it is we are trying to achieve. Without explicit
objectives to be achieved and a well-defined pro-
cedure to achieve them we can not be sure of their
accomplishment in whole or in part. Nor as we
update our planning will the route from old to
new objectives be clear.
2. Decisions are likely to be better if the effective-
ness of current programs, policies and projects are
evaluated. Without the feedback that evaluation
provides, our effort to improve our plan and adapt
it to new conditions is seriously hampered.
3. Decisions are likely to be better if alternative
ways of achieving an objective are considered and
analyzed. The awareness of goals and objectives
(#1) needs to be extended to a consideration of
the variety of ways of their achievement. Indeed,
the setting of objectives makes this easier. It
aids in generating alternatives and provides a
yardstick against which to judge them.
It will be clear that current decision-making with regard to
city DP lacks the above underpinnings.
In the following chapter an orientation is provided of
the organizational structure of the city and the major munic-
ipal data processing groups. At the present time these
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include Administrative Service, Health and Hospitals, Police,
Schools, Collector-Treasurer, Assessing and Library. (De-
tailed information for most of these is given in Appendix A.)
Following this we analyze in Chapter 3 the three largest
(other than central DP) units in order to determine the
"proper" data processing configuration. We shall use the
method for structuring the C/D decision developed by Rockart,
et al(ll). In doing so we shall ignore questions of cost
and ease of implementation and instead concentrate on such
factors as the nature of the environment, the task to be
performed, and the processing requirements.
Chapter 4 contains a brief account of how the actual
consolidation decision was made and implemented. It includes
an examination of the cost-reductions consolidation will
effect, as this has been the major reason advanced for the
plan. With this as background, Chapter 5 points out the
factors the present plan overlooks but which we feel are
critical for the success of any plan. However, we shall
be most interested in effectively carrying out the recommen-
dations developed in Chapter 3. Particularly useful for
this discussion is the model of the Boston bureaucracy due
to Nordlinger(10). Finally, the concluding chapter presents
our overall reflections.
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II. BACKGROUND: BOSTON AND DATA PROCESSING
In this chapter we present an overall view of the city,
and of the major municipal DP groups. In doing so, we hope
to provide an idea of the atmosphere in which decisions are
made at City Hall. Plans often reflect the planning group.
If so, we should not find it surprising later that, in spite
of paying lip service to centralization, in our opinion the
city has no coordinated, formal plan for carrying it out.
II.1 Overview of the Municipal Government
Boston's city government consists, at present, of over
25,000 people, 22 departments and numerous boards, offices,
committees and commissions. As illustrated in the formal
organizational chart in Figure 1, the City Council, School
Committee, Mayor and all beneath them are under the "full
control" of the electorate. There are naturally several
other discrepancies (let us say) between the formal, legal
structure and reality. For our purposes the most important
one deals with the Department of Administrative Services
(AS). In 1967, when Mayor White.assumed office, he found
a Director of Administrative Services (DAS) sitting over
the department, which includes such sub-divisions as Per-
sonnel, Budgeting, Purchasing and the Data Processing Unit.
Since that time the only statutory change which has been
been made in AS is the addition of a Deputy Director of
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Administrative Services. The Mayor has, however, made
numerous changes by executive orders which carry no legal
status (in the formal city-charter sense).
It must be remembered that over 85% of municipal em-
ployees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, established by and under the control of Massa-
chusetts state law. As such, the vast majority of employees
are effectively tenured in their positions since it is vir-
tually impossible to fire a Civil Service worker. (It has
been found, for example, that the rate of dismissal in the
city is .05%, or smaller by a factor of 26 than for a study
group consisting of 111 state and local governments(10).)
The only relatively effective control the Mayor has is over
his appointees, usually the department heads and commission-
ers. The DAS in particular is a very powerful position.
Besides his own department, he is chairman of several impor-
tant boards including that which oversees all capital spend-
ing by the city. Recognizing the importance of the position,
Mayor White first created the post of Deputy Mayor and the
then DAS, Edward Sullivan, was named to it along with two
other Deputy Mayors, though the latter were imbued with much
less power. Sullivan's position has more recently evolved
into that of the Vice Mayor. The salary he draws, however,
is still budgeted as that for the DAS, though technically
the post is vacant.
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Similarly, the position of Collector-Treasurer has
undergone a transformation. For many years his function
corresponded to that of a corporate treasurer and under
some administrations he was a figurehead. Continuing state
and municipal fiscal uncertainties, however, have led the
Mayor to place greater responsibility to the job, and James
Young, the Collector-Treasurer, is now the de facto Chief
Financial Officer for Boston.
The effect of these and other charges has been to con-
fuse and obscure the hierarchical chain of supervision, with
many people unsure of to whom they report and what the vari-
ous layers of supervision above them are. The result has
been difficulty in communication and integration of efforts
between groups. For example, the Office. of Management and
Budget (OMB) is another of the non-chartered offices at
City Hall. Its funding comes partially from the Budgeting
Division of the Administrative Services Department., and
partially from separately funded people. I have been al-
ternately told that OMB reports to the Deputy Director of
AS (also presently vacant, but there is an acting Deputy
Director) who, of course reports to the (currently vacant)
Director of AS or that OMB reports to the Deputy Director
of Fiscal Affairs of the Budget Division of AS, who is under
the purview of the head of Treasury, the Collector-Treas-
urer. Such occurrences are not uncommon in municipal gov-
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ernments, and are reported on by Meyer(9).
In at least one regard this confusion has some ration-
ality. Although on paper the city appears to have a strong
mayoral type of government, the effect of the Civil Service,
"Professionalism" (on the part of Police, Fire, Schools,
say) and the semi-autonomy of some departments (especially
Schools) has made the actual government one of extreme de-
centralization - as one City Haller put it, essentially
"government by department heads". It is clear that not
every leadership style will be effective under such cir-
cumstances. Mayor White's style is and may best be likened
to that of Franklin D. Roosevelt: let department heads fight
among themselves and pick up the ideas such clashes generate.
Whether Mayor White molded his leadership to be most effec-
tive to circumstances or whether the job selected the man
is a moot question. The point is only that such a style
is a natural background of all city actions and decisions
and may even be the only way of salvaging some order from
the internecine fighting.
To sum up: one of the major characteristics of city
government is an oft-exhibited lack of coordination and co-
operation between departments. This arises as a natural
consequence of the formal, as well as the informal structure.
(We shall see further evidence for this when we discuss
Nordlinger's Boston bureaucracy model.) The AS department,
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in particular, is characterized by confusion of authority.
Collecting the various factors, we begin to see the diffi-
culty in trying to formulate and implement any strong cen-
tralization plan, especially with Administrative Services
DP as the central facility.
11.2 Administrative Services Data Processing Unit
The DP unit of the Administrative Services Department
is the largest of the municipal DP groups. It consists of
50 people and had expenditures for FY 1976-77 of about
2.2M dollars. Its historic role was to prepare payrolls,
appropriation summaries and various statistical and record-
keeping functions for those units of the city and county
that lacked DP capability. In keeping with the centraliza-
tion plan, its goals as stated on the 1977-78 Budget is to
"service and consult all City Departments and/or Agencies
in their data processing needs". It is interesting to
note that funding is composed of 50% General Service Funds
and the remainder approximately evenly divided between
Sewer Services and Water Services. This combination origi-
nally arose from an examination of the proportions of work
done by the DP group for various city divisions when the
unit was quite young (late 1960's) and has remained frozen
since then.
Central DP is managed by the Director of Data Processing
(DDP), John Flanagan. Flanagan is a 31-year veteran of the
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civil service, first entering city government as a clerk
in the Auditing Department in 1946. Finishing college
part-time, he became a certified public accountant and
gradually rose through the civil service grades. At the
same time he developed an interest in data processing and
made extensive use of IBM training programs to acquire
proficiency in this area. In the late 1960's the city be-
gan to view DP more seriously - late compared to most cor-
porations or even other large cities. The AS-DP unit was
then created and rather than going out-of-house to bring a
newcomer into a relatively senior civil service position
to head the group, the search was confined to those present-
ly employed who had an interest (and, if possible, expertise)
in the DP function. Flanagan, by then a senior accountant
at Health and Hospitals (which has one of the oldest and most
extensive MIS groups in the city) therefore assumed the newly-
created post and has remained in it ever since.
Although AS has a relatively small ($4.OM in FY 1977-
78) fraction of the total city budget ($232.9M), Central
DP is one of the Department's major user of funds. It con-
sumes over 50% of the AS' expenditures (the Printing Division
uses another 30% and all others are individually less than
or equal to 10%). As mentioned above, total expenditures
for the AS-DP unit was about $2.2M last year which compares
with $825K for Health and Hospitals' MIS and $712K for Police
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DP, the next largest groups. Figure 2 displays FY 1976-77
Budget data for data processing before the arrival of the
158. Detailed information regarding the personnel, hard-
ware and software of Central DP and the other DP groups
is given in the Appendices.
We note from Appendix A that the number of actual
systems personnel is relatively small considering the size
(in terms of equipment, budget and responsibility) of Cen-
tral DP: 2 in technical programming and 9 in applications.
In fact, although the DP budget has grown in the past six
years from about $600K to over $2M, there has been no in-
crease at all in the staff. This conforms with the DDP's
own assessment of his division's responsbility; when ques-
tioned he felt it was "to provide DP capability", that is
primarily to provide operations support for the city rather
than any systems development.
Finally, as a further example of the confusion of chain
of command discussed earlier, we present in Figure 3 an or-
ganizational chart supplied by the AS-DP unit several months
ago. In spite of continual explanations to the head of
Central DP that his direct supervisor was only the Collector-
Treasurer, the habit of years would not allow him to foresake
the official supervisory hierarchy and he persisted in list-
ing the Vice Mayor as well. The Collector-Treasurer believes
he is responsible for Central DP. Whether the Director of
-21-
Figure 2
Expenditures: DP 1976-77
DEPARTMENT
PERSONNEL
Director
DP Mgr.
Systems Analyst
Computer Operators
Programmers
SMO & SUPV.
Clerical/Admin.
Other
PERSONNEL TOTAL
Admin. S.
1
3
8
4
6
24
4
1
51
H&H
1
2
7
2
4
21
Police
1
4
5
1
18
2
1
32+
Schools
19
Collector/
Treasurer
2
14
Asses-
sing
13
18
Library
10
PERSONNEL EXPENDITURES $721,406 510,346 315,549 278,000 164,520 219,826 111,607
HARDWARE 1,270,091 232,980 320,352 210,300 41,064 19,000 110,904
SOFTWARE 63,924 32,508 3,840 7,992 - - -
COMMUNICATIONS & OTHER 53,440 - 42,420 - - 40,000 70,000
CONTRACTUAL SERVICES
OFFICE SUPPLIES 167,760 50,000 30,000 - 10,000 20,000 -
OFFICE EQUIPMENT 16,063 - - - - - -
TOTAL $2,292,684 825,834 712,161 496,292 215,584 298,826 292,511
+: Does not include police officer personnel/cf. Appendix A.3
Figure 3
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Data Processing can ever be fully convinced of this remains
an open question.
11.3 Other Data Processing Divisions
Health & Hospitals' Management Information Services
group is the second largest DP unit in the city. The present
head, Michael O'Connor, Assistant Deputy Commissioner-MIS,
came directly to his present position in 1973 from the pri-
vate sector, with considerable EDP experience. Although
most of H&H funds come from the city budget, it is impor-
that to note that significant Federal grants are obtained
each year. This has enabled the MIS group to purchase its
own DEC System 20. This system is used for major clinical
applications (biochemistry, hematology, etc.), is tied di
rectly into the labs cia several Programmable Data Loggers,
and has 14 on-line interactive terminals. Since the system
is not fully utilized by the clinical applications, the ADC
has developed several interactive business applications
(A/P, tracking of patients, monthly billing, etc.) to allow
both his staff and the H&H users to gain experience with
such an environment. In addition to the DEC system there
is also a 370/125 which replaced the original Honeywell
1200 (dating from the beginning of the MIS division in 1968)
in 1973. It is used in a batch mode only. Finally a great
deal of effort is expended in the MIS group to upgrade
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personnel via in-house and outside courses, and considerable
study and benchmarking accompany all major contemplated
changes in hardware and software. These studies are fully
documented and available to other DP groups and H&H's higher
administrators, though little interest has been displayed
by either.
The Police DP group is similar to H&H in that it is
supervised by an EDP professional who entered city service
only four years ago (spending a year at Central DP before
taking his present position). It too has access to several
Federal programs and via a grant from the L.E.A.A. was able
to purchase a Data General Eclipse S/200 which is dedicated
to police-dispatching and 911-call handling. Batch jobs
were previously run on a 370/135 but, alone among the munic-
ipal DP groups, it has been replaced by a remote job entry
(IBM System 3 Model 10) system communicating with the central
158 mainframe. The primary justification advanced for the
changeover was potential reduction of the costs of hardware.
As evidenced by both the budget data (Figure 2) and
the Appendices, the remaining groups, while individually
small, in the aggregate do consume a significant fraction
of the total data processing expenditures. Most of their
funds go for personnel, though they possess a moderate
amount of equipment (370/125 in Schools, 360/20 and PDP-10
in Lib:rary, Univac in Collector-Treasurer). Aside from the
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summary information presented in the appendix we note in par-
ticular the relationship of Schools with respect to the rest
of the city. Figure 1 shows that the School Committee is
on a level equal to the Mayor, and the Department of Schools
is under its direct supervision. This fact combined with
the well-known parochialism and in-breeding of the School
Administration (cf. Schragg(14)) implies little mayoral con-
trol. Additionally the budget for Schools is required by
state law to be at least as large as the previous year's.
This has essentially given the department fiscal autonomy.
The effect of these forces is to make the school department
quite independent of the rest of the city administration
and in fact its budget does not even appear with other city
programs.
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III. A DESIGN FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS
FOR THE CITY OF BOSTON
Having outlined the major data processing groups within
the city, we can now discuss a procedure which, although
it does not provide a unique design for information systems,
is sufficiently rich to cover many of the factors involved.
It is based upon one developed by Rockart, Leventer and Bul-
len, but emphasizes those areas which we have found of par-
ticular concern in the municipal environment through conver-
sations held there. We view this design procedure as a
valuable tool in structuring the many facets of the C/D
decision. It is, however, just a tool and must not be re-
garded as law; by means of it, one may look at the various
conflicting factors and weight them according to the cri-
teria one considers most applicable to the case being con-
sidered. It does not purport to give the best answer. Our
current state of knowledge is incapable of this and further-
more, it is very unlikely that such an optimum exists.
A major failing of the procedure is that it generally
ignores the problem of converting design to actuality. All
of systems research of the last decade has taught us that
even with a design robust enough to encompass human and
organizational behavior features, one cannot assume that
merely presenting the design in a rational manner will ensure
its successful adoption. As long as the concept of a purely
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rational man remains a figment of the theoretical economist's
mind, we must pay careful attention to the implementation
process; we shall do this in Chapter 5. Nevertheless,
successful design will anticipate implementation so that
we shall find some overlap in specific details, if not in
perspective, between this chapter and Chapter 5.
III.1 Decomposition of the C/D Decision
As we have stated at the outset, the process by which
an organization arrives at an information systems plan is
not a "one-shot" occurence, but rather an ongoing one.
Whether or not centralization ,is valid for all or parts of
an organization today, a different conclusion may be pointed
to next month or next year. This is primarily so for two
reasons: first, the rapid rate at which technological ad-
vances have occurred and will continue to occur, cannot help
but change our basic premises periodically. Second, organ-
izations themselves evolve and learn, and in doing so change
their requirements and desires.
The second point is elaborated on fully by Gibson and
Nolan(4), who consider the growth of EDP to be composed of
at least four stages. They conclude that for each stage,
management should respond differently if DP is to mature
within the organization. For example, to counter rapidly
rising costs, DP is often rigidly centralized. While this
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brings costs under control, it does so at the risk of stunt-
ing DP's future evolution into a responsive, innovative
function capable of contributing to a wide spectrum of
users.
Increasingly we find technological barriers crumbling.
It is important, however, that we do not allow technology
to pull DP management, as was often the case in the past.
Instead we must use the freedom gained from relaxation of
technological constraints to more effectively bring about
the growth and maturation of the DP function. One way of
doing this is to maintain flexibility by avoiding premature
and unconsidered locking of DP into one configuration. Only
then can the DP function remain responsive to the type of
work to be performed and the environment in which it is
done.
In keeping with the above philosophy, it is evident
that Boston should not decide at any one time to centralize,
decentralize or distribute its entire DP function. Instead
it must break up the decision into sub-decisions, each com-
patible with the others and concerned with a logically re-
lated portion of the entire decision.
Research at C.I.S.R. and by others, has shown that the
information systems function can be usefully decomposed along
the dimensions of the three processes which it performs:
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e Systems Management - the process of managing the
information function, including setting of stra-
tegy, planning, setting standards, etc.
* Systems Development - the process of designing
and implementing new information systems.
e Systems Operations - the process of running the
computer center; i.e., accepting current input,
updating data bases, generating reports, monitor-
ing hardware, etc.
Each of the processes is sufficiently different in nature
from the others so each may be considered separately in mak-
ing the C/D decision, and there need be no correlation be-
tween the degree of centralization or decentralization of
one relative to another.
It may be helpful to outline the status quo in Boston.
In keeping with the viewpoint adopted in Chapter 1, we find
systems management to be strongly decentralized, with each
DP unit setting its own standards, selecting hardware, etc.
(We note however, that the idea for consolidation has been
advocated in principle by several commissioners for many
years, and did not arise among the DP managers.) Of course,
although each group may manage itself, there exists a wide
range in effectiveness, with only H&H having a revolving
3-5 year plan governing its strategic development.
Similarly, systems development, except for the upcoming
personnel system (to be supplied from outside), has been done
department by department according to local needs. Reference
to Appendix C, however, will show that most major information
-30-
systems recently installed are the work of outside consul-
thats or vendors, with municipal systems personnel perform-
ing in a maintenance mode. Finally systems operations -
which is all consolidation actually addresses, remains de-
centralized except, as noted previously, for the Police DP
division.
111.2 The Factor Table
A major tool developed by CISR for the analysis of the
C/D decision is the factor table, a version of which is pre-
sented in Figures 4 and 5. The table presents at a glance
a summary of the considerations which have been found to be
influential in a large number of case studies dealing with
the C/D question. We notice that each of the three processes
is further broken down into the activities or sub-processes
it performs, and the resources used to perform the sub-pro-
cesses. The factors are classified into major groups accord-
ing to whether they are characteristics of the parent organi-
zation (i.e., the City of Boston in our case), of organiza-
tional sub-units (e.g., Police or H&H Department), or of
a logical application group (LAG). The latter concept requires
further comment.
Systems development and operations, unlike systems man-
agement, must deal with individual applications,- each with
its own characteristics and requirements. Several applications
-31-
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Figure 5
FACTOR
NATURE OF APPLICATION
Strategic Planning
IMPLIES
Direction
Cent
Strength
Strong
SYSTEMS SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS
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Management Control Cent. Weak 0 0 o 0 0 0 0
Operational Control Decent. Weak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Process Control Decent. Strong o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Highly Sensitive & Critical for Sub-Unit Decent. Weak o o o o o o o
High Degree of Involvement From Sub-Mgt. Decent. Weak 0 0 0 o 0
Specific to Sub-Unit Decent. Weak o 0 0 0 0
Intention to Consolidate/Integrate the Cent. Strong o 0 0 0 0 0 0
Function
SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
High Degree of DP Expertise Required Cent. Weak 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sophisticated Technology/Processing Cent. Weak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reliability or Lack of Vulnerability Decent. Strong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Critical
Response/Turnaround Time Critical Decent. Strong - o 0 o o o
Adaptability to Rapid Change Critical Decent. Weak 0 0 0 0
Integration with Files from Other LAGS Cent. Strogg 0 0 00 0
Special Equipment Required Decent. Weak 0 0 0
PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS
Task Complex Cent. Weak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Custom Tailoring Required Decent. Weak 0 0 0 0 o
Use of Data Base Technology Cent. Weak 0 0 0 0 0 0
Large Memory Required Intermittent Cent. Strong 0 0 0 0 0 0
Data Communication Errors Critical Decent. Strong
may belong to one logically distinct process performed by
the organization and is therefore termed a LAG. Thus there
is usually minimal transfer of information between LAGs
but relatively intensive transfer within each LAG (e.g.,
applications in the order entry family such as billing and
Accounts/Receivable interact heavily). Because of this
"isolation" of LAGs we may decide the C/D question for
systems development and operations one LAG at a time. The
LAG may be considered the smallest unit or "atom" of deci-
sion. This quantizing of the C/D decision is beneficial
for several reasons:
- by splitting the decision into smaller ones, a
structure is imposed that allows us to more
easily comprehend the whole.
- LAGs are the natural way in which systems per-
sonnel view development of applications. It
is therefore not difficult to obtain needed
information concerning an organization's LAGs.
- the organization may elect to centralize, de-
centralize or distribute processing over a number
of years and may do so incrementally via LAGs.
- most importantly, as long as the organization
is not locked into a long-term position via
hardware purchases, flexibility of configuration
is maintained. Periodic reassessment of the
overall configuration combined with the incre-
mental implementation of LAGs allows the organiza-
tion to keep up with new technologies, management
ideas (or personalities) and the freeing up of
old or springing up of new constraints.
It is important to realize that a LAG may cut across
several organizational sub-units. If the sub-units are
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evaluated (via the factor table) as sufficiently different
from one another, the spanning LAG may be split further
into LAGs specific to each sub-unit. Finally we note that
splitting up the C/D decision and carrying it out incremen-
tally over a long period may lead inexorably to a decentral-
ized configuration. To counteract this tendency, it is
necessary that all pieces of the decision be periodically
re-examined to determine if a change in configuration is
now warranted.
We shall illustrate use of the table below. For now
we remark that uncircled regions of the factors-processes
matrix are not considered influential, and that a graphic
scheme of grading is followed which differentiates factors
according to whether they strongly or weakly indicate the
need for centralization or decentralization.
We now proceed to examine each of the dimensions of
the C/D decision in more detail and follow this with specif-
ic application to Boston.
Systems Management
The systems management portion of the C/D decision is
probably the most critical for any organization since it
might prematurely lock an organization into one path of
development thereby inhibiting the flexibility we stressed
above. There are numerous advantages to be gained in
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centralization of this process and in recent years this has
been generally the trend. This is often one stage of the
EDP growth pattern in an organization in order to bring
near-exponentially rising costs under control. The resul-
tant standardization of hardware, software, languages,
documentation, etc., not only brings costs to manageable
levels but, even in the case where operations and develop-
ment are not centralized, enables development costs to be
shared among users, allows movement of personnel and exper-
tise between groups, and so forth.
It is possible, of course, that many of the benefits
can be obtained without full centralization of systems
management. This is especially important when the organi-
zation allows users to maintain their own systems develop-
ment. In that case a centralized management can easily
lead to friction between the central managers and the de-
velopment-users - exacerbated when the latter are running
a cost center. An often acceptable substitute to a rigidly
decentralized systems management and one which allows many
of the benefits of centralized management, is some type of
steering committee, which may operate at any of several lev-
els.
For example, the Connecticut General Insurance Corpor-
ation(2) has completely centralized operations but its
applications development is done directly by four of its
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six divisions. Development for the two smaller divisions
is done by a corporate systems department which is part of
the centralized operations group. The systems management
function is then handled by steering committees for each
of the four larger divisions and an active senior EDP re-
view committee at the corporate level. The divisional
committees review and comment on plans, projects and
performance within the division. They do not make deci-
sions but rather they review the decision-making of the
users submitting the proposal. The senior EDP committee
performs a similar role for major projects, equipment
acquisitions, major changes in existing systems, organiza-
tional changes, and changes in key personnel. Hence data
processing decision-making is basically done at the division
level,.but corporate management is kept aware of what is
happening on at least a monthly basis via the senior EDP
review.
Systems Operations and Development
As seen from the factor table, systems operations can
be considered to be composed of the activities of edit and
control, updating, processing, and reporting. The major
resources used in performing these activities are hardware,
software and personnel (all centralized or decentralized
together) and the organization's data base. Similarly the
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development process may be seen to be composed of functional
design, detailed specifications and programming, implementa-
tion, and maintenance. In this case personnel is the major
(though not sole) resource utilized.
In making the C/D decision our structuring is such
that we must look at systems management as a single entity,
since the issues it confronts are not dependent on specific
applications. Our other basic decision-type is the config-
uration for development and operations of one LAG for one
organizational sub-unit. The fact that it is conceivable
for the sub-processes and resources of development and op-
erations to possess differing degrees of centralization or
decentralization requires that rigorously we should examine
each one separately. However, because these activities are
usually highly correlated, we shall do so only in a few cri-
tical cases and therefore shall use the simplified factor
tables of Figures 6 and 7.
111.3 Factor Table Analysis
We now apply the CISR decision criteria specifically
to Boston. Figure 6 includes the ratings for non-LAG fac-
tors. Note that in Figure 4, each factor has a strength,
and may or may not have a direction associated with it (if
not, it is taken to have equal strength in both directions).
In all cases we regard these directions and strengths as
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Figure 6
FACTOR Implies
Directn. Strength
GENERAL
Organizational Configuration
Uniformity of P&C and Other
Rpts.
Multiproduct/Multiservice
Cent.
Decent.
Strong
Weak
Strong
Sys
Dev
U
0
Sys
Op
U
Sys
Mgt
U
0
Em .1
DATA PROCESSING
Current Configuration Strong
Dependability Strong
Accessibility Strong
Expertise Strong
NATURE OF TASK
Highly Specialized Decent. Strong
Independent Decent. Strong
Change/Uncertainty Decent. Strong
High Technology/Knowledge Decent. Weak
Workers
OTHER FACTORS
Geographically Separate
Political Considerations
Organizational Size-Small
Dept. of Mgt. Talent Avail.
Experience with EDP
KEY:
Decent.
Decent.
Cent.
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak
0
0
0
0
U
0
Decentralization Strongly Indicated
Decentralization Weakly Indicated
Centralization Strongly Indicated
Q Centralization Weakly Indicated
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tentative. Individual circumstances may lead to a weaken-
ing or strengthening of a particular factor, or a complete
ignoral of it. Therefore the table factors of Figure 6 are
not identical to those in Figure 4. It is obvious that as
far as non-LAG factors are concerned, decentralization of
systems management, development and operations is strongly
indicated. Let us see why.
We have already mentioned the decentralized character
of city departments. Only a very few decisions are referred
to a supra-departmental level, the most notable being civil
service hiring/firing and approval of the departmental bud-
get. Even for these a commissioner has some leeway depending
upon his political power base. We therefore take the second
factor to be quite weak. With regard to the third factor,
although characterization of the city as having a multi-
product aspect seems incongruous, it is not when one consid-
ders the extremely large range of services cities are called
upon to provide today. They range from public transporta-
tion, police protection and sanitation, to health care,
education and welfare, to parks and recreation. Many of
these services were previously provided only by the private
sector, and in many suburban and rural areas still are.
Substituting multiservice for multiproduct then, we have
indeed a strong decentralization factor.
-40-
Moving to the next group on the table we find further
reasons for decentralization. Data processing is currently
decentralized and the natural inertia of organizations is
especially pronounced in a civil service bureaucracy. More
important however, is the opinion of potential users inter-
viewed, who considered the Administrative Services DP unit,
which is the intended central node, to be lacking in depend-
ability, accessibility and expertise. For example there is
not now nor ever been any attempt to measure utilization
of Administrative Services' CPU. The decision to upgrade
to the 370/158 was made last June on the basis that the
145 was busy on a single 8 AM-5 PM shift (there was only
one shift per day). An exhaustive evaluation of needs was
not conducted. Given the strong IBM-orientation of the DDP
of AS and his staff, and the usual practice of awarding the
contract without competitive bidding, the current configura-
tion was undoubtedly influenced by the IBM sales representa-
tive. (While this would be in keeping with city supervisor's
general reliance on outside consultants - cf. Chapter 5, more
specifically the DDP has only one assistant whom he relies
upon for input on hardware decisions in addition to other
responsibilities.) Further, the DDP has never approached
any would-be user to encourage use of the central facility.
It was solely through the Police DP director's efforts, made
because of the cost savings he foresaw for his group, that
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this department decided on its RJE facility. Even then it
required his personal powers of persuasion and friendships
acquired during his internship at City Hall to ensure the
three shift-24 hour service which his department required.
Finally, we mention what may soon give rise to serious
data processing and organizational difficulties. The Com-
missioner of H&H has firmly endorsed the consolidation con-
cept, primarily as a means of saving on equipment and per-
sonnel in these days of rapidly increasing medical costs.
He has committed the MIS group to the purchase of three
IBM hospital software packages (dealing with patient regis-
tration and schsduling) with the objective of putting
them on the City Hall machine by September. The proposed
system calls for 40 on-line interactive terminals through-
out the city hospitals, and implies a major impact on H&H,
but especially on Central DP, which has little knowledge
of such an operating environment.- Besides the limited
experience it has with IBM's IMS data base management sys-
tem, it has very little know-how of the needs of such a
large interactive system, with virtually no backup, recovery
and restore mechanisms. Indeed, although many query-only
terminals exist at City Hall, there are only three or four
interactive terminals (at OMB and BRA). In order to facil-
itate the implementation of the system, Central DP has loaned
MIS one systems analyst. The head of MIS suggested bi-weekly
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meetings with the DDP since he considers the obstacles
remaining-to be formidable. Although he sends an assistant
to meet with the head of MIS, the DDP has never attended.
In summary thus far, there are strong indications for
maintaining decentralization. According to our factor
table we must now examine the various organizational sub-
units. Rather than discuss each one separately in great
detail, we shall give a broad view of the three most impor-
tant ones simultaneously. (The lower portion of Figure 6
is filled in specifically for the Health and Hospitals
Department.)
The tasks of Police, H&H and Schools are, of course,
all uniquely different, quite specialized and independent
of one another thereby maintaining the decentralization
tendency. Although the next factor, change/uncertainty
in task does not apply to Police, a weak case may be made
for Schools given the continuing struggle over desegregation.
H&H, however, faces an unsettled future. With present ex-
penditures of close to $80M ($13M of which goes for Admini-
stration and General Support), it is one of the largest of
the city departments. Rising costs and an eroding tax base
are threatening its survival in its present form, and there
is the possibility of it becoming a separate corporation
as was done in New York City. It may also be forced to close
its in-patient facilities. The head of MIS, however, feels
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confident that his group can weather whatever the future
will bring. He has been preparing for a number of contin-
gencies since taking over in 1973. With talk of consolida-
tion going on even then, he decided to replace the Honeywell
with IBM hardware and convert all applications to ANS COBOL
in order to prepare for it. This did not prevent the ADC
from recognizing the potential usefulness of a minicomputer
system which her therefore acquired last spring. In prepar-
ing for the coming fiscal year he has released two alterna-
tive requests for bids, the first to renew the 370/125 but
with an option to change to an RJE, and the second to obtain
an RJE facility immediately. As part of the general attempt
to reduce costs a bid is also out calling for a key-taping
data entry service. This will enable MIS to eliminate its
statistical machine operators completely, although the ADC
has already significantly thinned their ranks. Provided
he feels sufficiently comfortable with the dependability
of Central DP, he envisions sending all batch jobs directly
to City Hall via courier as a worse-case (i.e., most savings)
scenario.
The fact that the major users we are considering are
physically separated from City Hall implies a weak decentral-
ization force. Much more important are the political con-
siderations involved, especially with regard to funding.
We have mentioned the Schools' semi-autonomy due to its
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unique budgetary freedom and supervision by the School
Committee, the latter discussed in vivid detail by Peter
Schragg in "Village School Downtown"(14). Though without
the same degree of fiscal independence, the Police Depart-
ment is eligible for a number of Federal grants and by means
of one from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
it was able to purchase its present minicomputer. H&H on
the other hand has entrusted the managing of its Federal
funds to Trustees, Inc., a private non-profit corporation.
The latter has been given the task of keeping as much Fed-
eral grant money out of the City's General Fund as possible.
As much as $20M of H&H's $80M expenditures are therefore
not from city coffers. The DEC system at MIS was purchased
with such funds. Clearly, such fiscal freedom fosters
centrifugal effects even when not used to support data
processing directly. Sutton(15), for example, describes
a behavioral theory of diversification in which managerial
behavior is a function of the surplus resources whose allo-
cation is at the sole discretion of management. His basic
hypothesis is that managers will typically seek to employ
their discretionary resources on projects related to the
established range of activities (at the same time increas-
ing their staff and therefore their status and/or salary).
If so, then the non-city funds, which are discretionary
since they are often not directed to bona fide city programs,
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would produce a ratchet-effect whereby it would be very
difficult to reduce such activities as separate DP facili-
ties to a soundly justified level.
The remaining factors in Figure 6 are weakly centraliz-
ing. Small DP units such as those in the Library or Assess-
ing Department are probably not cost-effective. All of
the DP groups lack depth of management talent and profession-
al EDP experience, though to varying degrees. Even for the
MIS group, the two Principal Systems Analysts and assistants
to the ADC, were formerly an ambulance driver and a social
welfare clerk, and have reached their present level through
passing civil service examinations and the more than one
month of training MIS requires for its personnel each year.
These factors pertain to the Central DP as well so they
are not as strong as they might otherwise be.
III.4 LAG-Related Factors
According to our model we should now analyze each log-
ical application group. To carry this out for the sixty
major applications from the departments of Police, H&H and
Schools for which we have data would be quite tedious. For-
tunately these applications fall into several groups which
are LAGs in a broader sense of the term. We shall therefore
look at these broader groups using specific applications
from these three departments as illustrations. To give the
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proper perspective of the range of applications involved,
Appendix B contains a listing of the major systems in these
departments along with some of their characteristics.
Hospitals
The computer-based applications for the Department of
Health and Hospitals fall into five main categories, accord-
ing to their primary task or function. These are:
- accumulation and reporting of statistical
information
- patient management, billing and A/R
- personnel listings, payroll, reports
- appropriations and costs tracking
- clinical and laboratory data acquisition and
reporting
The last application is quite similar to one implemented in
a large medical group practice and reported on by Rockart
et al. In the present case, the system consists of 22 pro-
grams with 2 sorts and includes 10 on-line data entry and
2 on-line inquiry programs. Its purpose is to provide for
on-line entry of patient administrative data to which re-
quested laboratory tests and their results are correlated
(via both manual entry and on-line data acquisition) for
production of various reports and billing. It applies to-
both ambulatory and in-patients on a 24-hour, 7 day/week
basis. As presently configured, reports are both CRT and
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hardcopy, and a tape is produced for ancillary billing. It
is intended that eventually the test results, which are now
outputted in an aggregate form, will be placed directly on
individual patient reports and the system will be expanded
beyond the present biochemistry lab. Clearly this is a
classic example of a specialized LAG essentially for process
control. The lab itself is a rapidly changing environment
and such a system deals with a critical portion of its
operations. It is required to be on-line continuously so
that reliability is a must as well as quick response time
on occasion. Special equipment (at present including two
programmable data loggers and 15 auto-analyzer interfaces)
is required as well. The only centralizing forces are
the complexity of the task and the need to integrate with
the master patient file when the system is fully developed.
Figure 7 illustrates the factor table for this particular
LAG and, when combined with Figure 6 effectively shows that
decentralization or distribution is the indicated configur-
ation. In fact, it was for this application that the ADC
of MIS pushed for the DEC System 20, although it is used
for others. He was quite convinced that this was the proper
path to pursue and so successfully fought down the original
proposal for a $250K turnkey system.
At the other extreme are those applications dealing with
statistical reports. These include systems such as those for
-48-
Figure 7
FACTOR
NATURE OF APPLICATION
Strategic Planning
Management Control
Operational Control
Process Control
Highly Sensitive & Crit.
.for Sub-Unit
Hi Degree of Involvement
from Sub-Mgt.
Specific to Sub-Unit
.Intention to Consolidate
Function
SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
Hi Degree of Expert. Req'd
Sophisticated Technology/
Processing
Reliability/Vulner. Crit.
Response/Turnaround Crit.
Adapt. to Rapid Change
Critical
Integration
Other LAGs
Special Equipment Needed
PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS
Task Complex
Custom Tailoring Req'd.
Use of D.B. Technology
Large Memory Req'd Inter
Data Commun. Errors Crit
IMPLIES
Directn.
Decent.
Decent.
Decent.
Decent.
Decent.
Decent.
Cent.
Decent.
Cent.
Strength
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
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Sys.
Dev.
E
F1
0
Sys.
Op.
U
El
U
U
LI
0
0
KEY: Decentralization Strongly/Weakly Indicated
010 Centralization Strongly/Weakly Indicated
El 1 0
Lead Paint Poisoning, Tuberculosis, and Vital Statistics.
They are demographic in nature and are usually not concerned
with financial matters. Although the Lead Poisoning and
Vital Statistics reports are generated daily, the others
have a weekly or longer time-frame so that turnaround time
and reliability are not critical. In addition, these appli-
cations generally have high CPU use-times (typically an
hour or more on the 370/125). Reviewing Figure 5, the
only indicator for decentralization is the weak "specific
to sub-unit". Similarly there are few strong centralizing
factors. Although the reports may be used for some stra-
tegic planning of health programs, this is strategic within
the department, not the city as a whole. Some of the
applications do interact with other H&H LAGs peripherally
(e.g., Medicare Claims Accumulation Reporting with Medicare
Cost Reporting) and Vital Statistics, at least, has one
of the larger core requirements, so centralized operations
may be more efficient. In summary then, there is no strong-
ly indicated direction. At MIS these are all run in batch
on the 125 - none on the time-sharing mini-system.
The personnel applications include the payroll system,
personnel maintenance and personnel budget estimate systems.
The latter two provide information for various other City
Agencies on a weekly or annual basis. In addition there
is a personnel payroll projection system to keep track of
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the remaining appropriation by cost center, and an overtime
reporting system. Again there are no decentralizing factors
but the need for this information on a larger-than-department
scale points towards centralization. The city is, of course,
currently looking for a personnel and/or payroll system
so that centralization of this LAG would seem correct also
from a practical point of view. However, there will be
some difficulty in interfacing H&H with the rest of the
city for both personnel and other LAGs. The city at present
utilizes an 8-digit appropriations code while H&H, operating
scrupulously on a cost center basis, is using a 14-digit
code thus giving a much finer breakdown of funds flow. Such
a situation might be desirable if the central node were in-
terested only in aggregate figures. However, this must be
definitely planned for so that in either case a certain
degree of centralized systems development would be necessary.
The remaining LAGs more clearly call for decentraliza-
tion. The Inpatient-Admissions-Discharges-Census applica-
tion, for example, operates on a daily cycle to provide
information relative to patients' location and medical con-
dition. Reliability and turnaround are important for ef-
fective use of physical and staff resources. Because of
the heavy dependence of billing and A/R programs on such
patient management systems, they must be considered together.
Several of the systems handle such matters for the Neighbor-
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hood Health Centers so that a certain amount of centraliza-
tion has already occurred. Further centralization beyond
the H&H Department would reduce the responsiveness of the
neighborhood concept and would be inadvisable. It is the
patient scheduling and registration system that the Commis-
sioner of H&H is extending throughout the hospital system
and moving to Central DP using IBM software. Considering
the importance of this LAG for operational control of health
care facilities, there would seem to be a good deal of risk
involved in this. Although the new system requires exten-
sive use of data base technology and is quite complex, both
facts pointing to centralization, the question remains as
to whether Central DP can meet the reliability constraints
in what is new territory for both it and H&H (the old system
is batch only).
Finally the appropriations LAG should be viewed even
more strongly than the patient management LAG, as one which
should remain firmly within the control of H&H's administra-
tors. This is reinforced by the importance the latter attach
to keeping Hospital-directed monies out of the General
Treasury. It is probably not surprising that a number of
these cost reporting and appropriation control applications
were only developed last summer and are on the DEC system.
Another application recently developed is the Inventory
Control System, used on a daily, weekly and monthly basis
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to maintain control and reporting of selected inventory
items throughout H&H. Although presently on the 125, the
criticalness of the application for proper control and
corresponding need for reliability would point toward keep-
ing such a LAG decentralized and placing in an interactive
mode for the daily cycle items.
Schools
The situation at the School Department is considerably
different. There exist only six major applications:
- student class-scheduling
- audio-visual booking
- preparation of report cards
- material requistioning
- appropriation accounting
- achievement testing
Most of these occur at very long, predefined time intervals
(e.g., 5 report cards/year, monthly AV library update and
booking). The accounting cycle is shortest, coming weekly,
class-scheduling semi-annually, and achievement testing
(including scoring with optical readers) is done on an ad
hoc basis. The work load is such that very heavy processing
takes place intermittently. In most respects these appli-
cations are the antithesis of decentralizing in nature be-
cause of what they do not require: high reliability, DP
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expertise, adaptability to change, etc. They would be
prime candidates for Central DP if political factors were
not involved.
Police
Finally, Police DP applications may be split into three
major groups
- personnel/budget applications
- statistical reports
- police-assisting applications
Members of the first group deal with basic accounting for
BPD. They maintain a master personnel file, compute over-
time/court time payments, etc. While Overtime is run daily,
all others are on a weekly cycle. There exist no factors
for decentralization and as City Hall has the intention
to consolidate personnel/payroll, centralization seems to
be called for. The statistical report applications all
deal with accumulating large arrays of crime details. Thus
Field Interrogations collects descriptions, locations, times
of known criminals, suspicious persons, vehicles, etc.;
Field Incident Reporting maintains daily files of incidents
handled by BPD, to be supplied to the FBI, to reallocate
resources periodically and so on. These applications are
run on either a daily or weekly schedule and all require
at least 300K of core. They would probably benefit by
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moving from a 135 to a 158 and this was confirmed at BPD -
turnaround time is much improved, although early in January
when the RJE was operational but the 145 still at City Hall,
there appeared to be serious slowdowns.
The last Police application group we have termed "po-
lice-assisting" because they perform critical functions for
the department. Because they are of a process control na-
ture, require high reliability and fast turnaroudd time
on an interactive basis, decentralization would be most
appropriate. The first of these is the Computer-Aided
Dispatch System (CAD). It is used to maintain and control
the current status of all response units in the field, to
handle all incoming 911-calls from entry through clearance
by a response unit, and to maintain data on incidents, re-
sources, etc., for the off-line systems described above.
The system includes 25 on-line entry and 10 on-line inquiry
programs and operates 24 hours/day in real-time (i.e., one
transaction at a time). The Data General mini was purchased
specifically with this application in mind. CAD required
a degree of expertise beyond the capability of Police (or
Central) DP and was developed and implemented by ADL Sys-
tems. The remaining applications are of a similar nature
to CAD though simpler. For example, Wanted Persons, and
Stolen Vehicles are 24-hour interactive systems with ob-
vious purposes. They, together with Tow and Hold (inquiry-
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only for parking scofflaws), are in the same CICS system
on the 158. Our criteria strongly indicate decentralization
for them. There was in fact some indication in conversa-
tions that Police DP was thinking of moving the CICS appli-
cations to the Data General machine, but no final decision
has been made.
Summary
We have examined one possible method by which the con-
figuration of municipal data processing may be decided upon.
Its primary feature is the decomposition of the C/D decision
into subdecisions which need not be resolved simultaneously.
This methodology therefore fits well with our feeling that
the process of planning, with the ability to efficiently
respond to changing conditions, is more important than the
plan which exists at any one moment. From our analysis we
can deduce several conclusions so far:
Those factors which are not dependent on specific log-
ical application groups strongly indicate that systems
management is best arranged in a decentralized configuration.
Recall that the other dimensions of the decision are to be
made LAG by LAG. Therefore for those LAGs which clearly
call for decentralization we are led to the conclusion that
systems development and operations be decentralized as well.
Certain applications, however, point to centralization,
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which leads to a conflict. Should we weight organizational
and general issues more heavily and decentralize or should
we be guided by the specifics of the LAG and centralize?
Fortunately C/D is not an integer-valued variable.
There exist a continuum of possible configurations. As
we shall discuss in the next chapter, there are significant
savings to be gained by a consolidation of hardware. Hence,
because most of the C-pointing LAGs are of the traditional
batch-oriented tape-based type, their operations could be
moved to Central DP for greater efficiency and savings.
Those groups whose LAGs consist entirely of this type (e.g.,
Schools, Assessing) could be completely disbanded, though
systems personnel at Central DP must be correspondingly
strengthened.
Because of the organizational decentralization and
lack of coordination, it is not surprising that one depart-
ment is not aware of what the next is up to (at least be-
fore the fact). Thus in spite of plans to consolidate,
several DP groups have recently recognized the need for,
and developed very specialized LAGs and obtained minicom-
puters for them. That is, because the centralization goal
is not being enforced (promoted is a better word as it would
be next to impossible to force the departments to do any-
thing), these groups are following their self-interests
and most of the decentralizing factors we have discussed
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are naturally leading them along this path.
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IV. THE CONSOLIDATION DECISION: A CRITICAL LOOK
In the previous chapter we discussed how we would make
the C/D decision, and we looked at several departments in
detail to ascertain the position indicated for them on the
centralization-decentralization axis. In the next chapter
we discuss how best to implement such a configuration in
light of the organizational constraints which abound. Be-
fore doing so we wish to briefly examine the actual consol-
idation "plan" undertaken by the city in order to understand
its shortcomings.
The idea of consolidating city computer resources first
arose in the late 1960's. At that time many city departments
had jumped on the DP bandwagon and as many as 13 installa-
tions were in existence, the most advanced of these being
an IBM 1430 in AS, 1401 in Schools and Honeywell 1200 in
H&H. The city hired the consulting firm of J.R. Riley As-
sociates to study the situation and the latter advised
eliminating all these facilities in favor of one centralized
unit. Several of the smallest installations were quickly
absorbed into Administrative Services DP when the present
Director of Data Processing took over. Since then there
has been no further consolidation until the Police depart-
ment this spring. A precedent was set which has continued
to the present, namely the reliance on outside consultants
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to provide all strategic or global development of the DP
function at City Hall (e.g., standards, equipment selection,
evaluation or actual implementation of new applications
proposals, etc. - cf. Appendix C for recent consultations).
In the early 1970's the present payroll system was put in
place by Keane Associates. Also at this time Riley left
his own firm to join Keane, and Riley Associates was taken
over by its vice-president, Clasby. Since then Clasby and
Keane Associates have been steadily engaged by the city.
Throughout the last several years then (most recently
in 1975), Clasby has been hired to study the idea of central-
ization. Its focus has always remained purely on possible
cost reductions through consolidation of hardware. It
has tacitly assumed personnel would be eliminated and has
ignored the determination of suitability of centralized
systems management, development and operations as we have
attempted in Chapter 3. Fortunately (for Clasby), the Vice
Mayor and Collector-Treasurer are supporters of consolida-
tion so that each year additional funds have been obtained
for AS-DP despite the lack of analytical justification
such as fiscal constraints or payback. One important DP
manager estimates the total time Clasby spent talking with
him to be 38 minutes. Moreover, to the best of anyone's
knowledge, there has never emanated from these studies any
written document specifying procedures for the implementation
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of a consolidation plan. Nor, in fact, have any of the
users who are to be affected by consolidation ever seen
anything in writing giving the results of Clasby's studies
or its recommendations.* Its reports have been confined
to informal appraisals to the Vice Mayor and Collector-
Treasurer.
As previously mentioned, only Police DP has yet availed
itself of the expanded Central DP facilities. The motiva-
tion for the changeover was entirely one-sided as Central
DP did nothing to encourage use of its new capacity. After
numerous discussions between the ADC of MIS and the Director
of Police DP, the latter requested bids for a remote job
entry. In keeping with the general Central DP bias for
IBM, he selected an IBM System 3 Model 10 which, at $5000
per month, was the costliest and so required "greater than
usual justification". Among the benefits he cited to his
staff concerning the consolidation were:
- savings of approximately $17,000/month
- greater computing power to Police DP
- tripling of existing disk storage capacity
- access to more sophisticated software without
having to maintain it. (This usually must be
done by the best or most technically-oriented
*These statements are strong and are intended so. Neither we
nor a group of three EDP executives who voluntarily conducted
a survey of data processing last year were able to uncover
such documentation. Even if it exists, the users' percep-
tion is that of no plan.
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of systems and programming staff thereby
reducing their impact elsewhere.)
- retaining of Police DP organization.
We note the last item indicates that there was some concern
that the DP group would be discontinued. There were some
rumors of moving everything to the City Hall mainframe
and,,-if one looks at the present configuration (Appendix D)
with its twenty-four 3330-11 disk storage devices, one
cannot help but suspect that in the back of someone's mind
is the will o'wisp notion of the Total Integrated Data Base.
However the experience of Police and H&H DP would seem to
belie that. The ADC is tentatively considering an RJE and
he feels that if such a plan comes about, it will come from
him and his assistants forcing City Hall to listen to it.
Consolidation has been justified in terms of cost re-
ductions so that it is useful to look at this issue. In
attempting to ascertain whether there has resulted any
savings, one is faced with the difficulty that the allocation
of appropriations for non-profit making organizations are
often polite fictions. Usually, however, historical budget
figures are accurate. Reproduced in Figure 8 is the budget
data for Administrative Service DP for the coming fiscal
year. It will be seen that there is some discrepancy between
the data of Figures 2 and 8 for FY 1976-77. Some of it is
due to differences in dis-aggregation between the two
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figures. Also the Personnel expenditures refer to two
different dates and there were a number of promotions
and a reduction of one employee in the interim. However
the Current Charges & Obligations figure (the hardware and
software expenditure) is significantly different; the Figure
8 value being about $138K higher. The reason for the dif-
ference is that the lower figure is the actual amount recom-
mended and contracted for last July for the 145 system.
The Figure 8 value however, along with the total DP expend-
iture, has been post facto adjusted upwards to include the
five months (by July 1) or so for which the 158 and 12
additional disks will have been operating in lieu of the
former system. Thus the $42K increase in computer leases
for FY 1977-78 is actually at least a $180K increase (there
may be additional increases due to communications and 3-shift
operations by personnel).
On the other hand, the head of Police DP estimates
savings of about $17K/month from the replacement of the 135
with System 3. This is in agreement with the contractual
figures of Appendix A.3 when the $320K there ($26.6K/mo.)
is broken down further by actual equipment replaced. Of
course no personnel have been lost so that so far consolida-
tion has resulted in a decrease in annual expenditures of
about $24K ($1270+320+64 before vs. 1514+116 after). How-
ever, AS leases went up by $138K while Police saved $102K
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Figure 8
1977-78 Program Budget
Administrative Services - Data Processing
Personal
Services
Contractual
Services
Supplies
& Materials
Current Charges
& Obligations
1974-75
EXPENDITURE
669,651
12,492
112,741
1,038,731
1975-76
EXPENDITURE
734,212
51,948
96,838
1,214,291
1976-77 1977-78
APPROPRIATION RECOMMENDED
706,457
53,440
167,760.
1,472,000
746,676 40,219
55,440 2,000
167,760 -
1,514,061 42,061
Equipment
1,841,857 2,147,479 2,415,720 2,500,000
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TOTAL
8,242 50,190 16,063 16,063
84,280
($17K/mo for 6 months) so that the plan cost the city $36K
additional for FY 1976-77.
It is interesting to further note that the requested
budget for Police administrative and general support (depart-
ments other than AS do not dis-aggregate their DP groups)
is taking a jump upwards of more than 40% (or about $2M,
increasing its share of total Police expenditures from about
6.5% to 8.5%). In examining administrative budget data for
the other departments for the coming year we found slight
reductions overall. (The total city budget is $232.9M for
FY 1977-78 vs. $273.lM for FY 1976-77.)
It is clear that there is potential for greater savings
in hardware costs if several other departments join in con-
solidating. H&H's MIS estimates that, if it desired to,
with an RJE it could reduce its costs by $80K/year, or by
using a courier to City Hall, get rid of all but its DEC
system and save nearly $15K/month ($175K/year). Even
several of the smaller DP groups, when combined can nearly
match this. Of course, without an in-depth examination of
current and projected workloads for these groups and the
utilization rate at Central DP, it remains an open question
as to whether the present configuration is adequate for
them all. It was obvious from interviews that such a study
would be strongly resented from an outsider and, for rea-
sons explained in Chapter 5, is unlikely to be implemented
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from within.
As evidenced by Figure 2, an area of equally signifi-
cant cost reductions is that of personnel expenditures.
Consolidation has not addressed this at all, and makes
no plans for reducing DP staffs. On the contrary, since
Central DP is at most interested in providing systems
operations service, the various departments would need to
maintain systems development staff. Moreover our own
analysis in Chapter 3 indicated that a decentralized sys-.>
tems management and development is necessary for those
departments with non-traditional DP needs such as H&H and
Police. However, inspection of Figure 2 shows that a very
large proportion of personnel in each group are statistical
machine operators. Although we have not displayed expend-
itures broken down by job classification, SMO's account
for 36% of wages in AS, 38% in MIS, 45% in Police, 49%
in Library, 66% in Assessing and 75% in Collector-Treasurer.
Substantial savings can be realized if most of these per-
sonnel can be eliminated. It is recognition of this which
caused the ADC of MIS to seek bids for data entry services.
At a cost of about $l0OK/year, this would result in over
$l09K/year savings in wages for the original 21 SMO's in
place at the start of the present fiscal year. He has in
fact already reduced the number of SMOs by at least one
third and expects to have eliminated nearly all such posi-
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tions in the coming year as other available civil service
slots open up.
Finally, additional savings may be realized if IBM is
granted approval for a new type of rental contract for
government. This contract would allow reduced rentals on
large scale government systems such as those for a federal
department, city or state. By renting all city equipment
via one extended contract, significant rental reductions
would be possible.
Summary
The decision to conselidate was based quite narrowly
on hardware costs alone. No serious thought has been given
to the fact that what is being attempted is a technically
complex task and additionally an organizational change at
odds with most city norms. While we have demonstrated
that hardware savings are real, there do exist other, less
potentially disruptive means to the same end. Finally,
all talk of additional consolidation is superfluous without
a careful inventory of workloads and capacity which the
DDP and several other DP supervisors seem unable and/or
unwilling to produce.
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V. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
The decision process of Chapter 3 is in direct contrast
with the actual decision which we have seen to be of limited
scope. By an examination of applicable factors our scheme
is closer to the municipal realities than the consolidation
plan. However, one cannot depend upon the rationality of a
plan as the sole incentive for its adoption and success.
Equally important is the procedure by which the plan is
integrated with its environment, i.e., the process of im-
plementation. Studies (cf. for example(6)) have demonstrated
that many of the failures in Management Information Systems
have come not from lack of understanding the technology
involved, but rather from an ignorance of the human factors.
Therefore no plan is complete without thought being given
to the management of the change process. In the present
chapter we discuss one possible approach and in doing so
shall uncover further shortcomings of the current city plan.
Particularly valuable for the understanding of Boston's
bureaucracy is the model developed by Nordlinger(10) in his
study of the effects of decentralization of government via
"Little City Halls". It will be seen that many of the ob-
stacles faced in trying to effect DP changes are not atyp-
ical of the city at large.
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Historically the implementation of centralized systems
has caused disruptions in organizations, often discouraging
the choice of this alternative. Much of the information
systems literature discuss possible corollaries to the
centralizing process such as:
- creation of high levels of anxiety and tension
among management
- decrease in the level of local incentive and
job satisfaction
- inadequate response by central staff to
local needs and priorities.
Demb(3) in particular, reports on the centralization of a
large multi-campus public university. Like Boston, the
university is composed of a number of independent-minded
sub-units. Unlike Boston, the university embarked on a
defined six-year plan in 1973 after a year of self-study
and system evaluation. Even so, a great deal of dissatis-
faction arose with the information system centralization
process. This arose primarily as a result of difficulties
engendered by the management of the change process itself
rather than the specific characteristics of the centralized
system. For instance, development of shared applications
for the system is scheduled to be completed in 1979. In-
terim systems therefore had to be developed for local cam-
puses. A major problem occurred where local campuses were
relatively unsophisticated and therefore dependent on the
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central computer staff for development of these systems.
The central staff was not equipped to meet these demands
and as a result there was great tension and negative re-
actions at these campuses. Where local campuses were able
to develop interim systems on their own, and thus exploit
the new computer system, reaction tended to be positive.
This seems to be the case with Boston as well. Only
the Police and H&H DP units (the latter somewhat reluctantly)
are at all interested in making use of the central facility.
The others, much more unsophisticated in DP, are resisting
and, of course, Central DP is doing nothing to encourage
them. The situation at Schools is particularly interesting.
Its original system used an IBM 1401 and its applications
were written in Autocoder. Ten years later its applications
are still 90-100% in Autocoder and the 125 must be operated
under emulation of the 1401. Nor is there any intention
to convert these to COBOL as MIS did-for all its applica-
tions. Thus the 370/158 will have to emulate a 1401 for
Schools if the latter is to make use of it. At the very
least this indicates that Schools DP is engulfed by day-
to-day operations and cannot spare personnel for the job.
But it may also indicate a general lack of interest or
knowledge of planning so that resources may be inefficient-
ly utilized and so largely wasted.
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It is evident that some of the forces operant in city
government cannot be changed. A new city charter will not
be written to aid in centralizing DP so that the actors,
setting and interactions therein must be accepted as given.
Any plan, therefore, that purports to make large-scale
changes in city operations must-be aware of these unyielding
forces. As Allison(l) points out in his discussion of the
functioning of the U.S. government during the Cuban Missile
Crisis:
"At any given time, a government consists of
existing organizations, each with a fixed set
of standard operating procedures and programs.
The behavior of these organizations - and con-
sequently of the government - relevant to
an issue in any particular instance is, there-
fore, determined primarily by routines established
in these organizations prior to that instance."
(He goes on to remark that ordinarily change occurs quite
slowly over time and that dramatic shifts occur only in
response to major disasters.) We have discussed particular
organizational factors such as sources of funding already.
But no discussion of the city is complete without examining
the effect the Civil Service has on operating procedures,
attitudes and quality of services.
V.1 The CiVil Service in Boston
All of the employees in the various data processing
departments are civil servants. The usual entrance to such
a position is by passing a written exam and being placed
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on an eligible list according to exam grade. These exams
measure only an applicant's knowledge of the specific task
involved in the prospective job. Most applicants spend
at least six months on the waiting list, which usually
implies they are unwilling, or unable, to find a job else-
where. Once he has the job, a worker finds himself part
of the classic risk-return tradeoff. In return for an al-
most-tenured job, one finds uncompetitive salaries relative
to the private sector (particularly at middle and upper
levels), a telescoping of salary differentials and the
fact that on-the-job performance plays virtually no part
in promotions. Advancement comes via seniority and compet-
itive qualifying exams. In exceptionally rare cases,
usually limited to top positions in the department hier-
archy, a departmental commissioner may authorize a non-
competitive qualifying exam which, if passed, will allow
the promotion.
The ramifications of these recruitment, promotional
and disciplinary patterns are many. Most workers usually
stay in one department (and because few are fired, with
the same group of people) all their working lives. The
number of persons in dead-end jobs is very large. When
openings do occur they are very often staffed from within.
(Several confirming instances, such as selection of the DDP,
come to mind.) More importantly, from these patterns Nord-
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linger has postulated a "bureaucratic ethos" for Boston,
viz, "Superiors strongly avoid actions that may cause strain,
friction or antagonism between themselves and their subor-
dinates." From this he deduces seven behavioral rules
applicable to Boston's civil servants:
1. Supervisors exercise minimal control and
supervision over their subordinates.
2. Supervisors set low performance standards
for their subordinates.
We will refrain from commenting on these as what they imply
is obvious.
3. Middle and high-ranking officials hoard what
authority they have vis-a-vis their subord-
inates; there is a determined refusal to
devolve responsibility and independence to
lower level civil servants.
If true, rule 3 implies there would be a high degree of
centralization of power and authority within departments.
This is difficult to verify. Although the DDP of AS is
regarded as powerful and somewhat autocratic, this may have
more to do with 31 years experience with the city than a
tendency to hoard power.
4. Supervisors set up routines and work schedules
according to patterns of work as opposed to
patterns of service.
5. When confronted with difficult problems, super-
visors will not give them adequate attention -
they are referred to another, delayed, treated
superficially, etc.
These two rules have important implications for the present
centralization plan. If other departments follow the lead
-73-
of Police, Central DP will find itself more and more con-
fronted by customers imposing demands on its facilities.
It will have to give much greater attention to its role
as a provider of service and devote energy to the under-
standing of the business of its clients. Several users
have expressed concern over its ability to do this, and
the limited experience with Police bears this out.
6. Supervisors rarely if ever undertake projects;
they limit their unit's work almost exclusively
to maintenance activities - activities that
constitute the unit's minimal responsibilities.
Because the centralization plan is not a formal one, this
rule agrees with the lack of interest of the DDP in further-
ing consolidation, as well as Schools' emulation of a 1401
when it could have a 125. (We are taking it for granted
that the ADC of MIS, coming from a different background,
is not an adherent of the ethos for he is an anomaly.)
Similarly, rule six conforms to the fact that consultants
are used very extensively in both designing and implement-
ing new projects in departments. The bids put out for the
anticipated personnel system, for example, require the
vendor to supply his own personnel to interface and imple-
ment the system. The Police CAD system, also, was entirely
the work of ADL Systems Inc. It is generally felt by both
out- and insiders downtown that the city does not make prop-
er use of its consultants. In keeping with tule five,
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managers are only too happy to let consultants come in and
make the hard decisions, and in order to make any progress,
the latter must derive their authority from the Vice Mayor.
Only then can inter-departmental decisions ever be settled,
though care must still be taken to placate all groups in-
volved for, as Nordlinger points out, authoritarian actions
usually fall.
7. Upper level officials devote virtually no
attention to the analysis of departmental
procedures and operations. If relevant
information were supplied from outside the
department, the officials would try to
ignore it and not carry out any changes
indicated.
We have already remarked on the lack of any knowledge of
hardware utilization at Central DP either before or after
the addition of the 158. Perhaps a more striking example
was, until the search by OMB for a personnel system, a
complete lack of documentation of what the actual manual
systems consisted of. In any case, rule seven is particu-
larly distressing because it indicates a lack of strong
management control and of knowledge of the current opera-
tions' bottlenecks and limitations. Both are essential
before any plan can be realistically decided upon.
In summary we can say that these rules imply a great
waste of human and physical resources, and since the top
officials are adverse to ordering changes, there is a con-
tinuation, if not reinforcement, of the conditions which
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permit and encourage this underutilization of resources.
V.2 The Management of Change
Having examined some of the organizational and motiva-
tional obstacles presented by Boston to a would-be innovator,
we may ask how best to carry out changes indicated by our
analysis. Clearly one cannot expect to dramatically change
the standard operating procedures of the city, rooted as
they are in the civil service regulations. As long as city
management is inhibited by these regulations, the private
sector promotional and salary incentives will remain quite
weak. What must be tried for instead is an incremental
approach at change. This would be in keeping with both
Allison'.s idea of bureaucratic evolution and the subdivision
of the C/D decision we have envisioned. The key, of course,
is getting the civil servants to move along this path of
planned change. Regardless of the actual procedure followed,
current organizational development theory advocates the
"seeding" of the organization with one or more change agents.
Gibson and Nolan(5), who approach the question from an in-
formation systems background, reach a similar conclusion:
The MIS manager and senior management must conceive
of this job as.. (that of)...a change agent. As
such, attention must be paid to an analysis of
informal and behavioral forces that emerge as sources
of resistance or support when change is contemplated...
In deciding upon change agents for municipal data processing
departments, there are really only two candidates, the
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departmental commissioner and the head of that department's
DP division. Commissioners, in addition to being the ul-
timate authority within the department, may trade on the
power of the Mayor as well. However, although it is an
appointed position, many commissioners are chosen from
among the upper level civil service management of their
department. They are therefore firmly conditioned to the
bureaucratic ethos and may, in fact, rejoin the civil
service ranks with a new administration. Nevertheless,
support by the commissioner of a department for any infor-
mation systems plan is a prerequisite, as numerous case
studies have indicated that top management support is crit-
ical to the success of such plans. In addition, the fact
that there is, at present, any momentum for the consolidation
plan at all is due largely to the pressure of several
department heads.
Given the seven behavioral rules, it is obvious that
pressure at the top is not sufficient to overcome the inertia
of standard operating procedures. As exhaustively detailed
by Nordlinger, Little City Hall managers were not effective
unless they had enlisted the support of line supervisors.
The managers, being "outsiders" (in both a departmental
and civil service sense) were looked upon with hostility
and succeeded only through much effort spent in sociability,
and reciprocal work-related favors when these were possible.
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In the present case we have seen the direct correlation
between the DP head and the willingness of his department
to coordinate with other DP groups. While it is too much
to expect the DDP of AS and his subordinates to change,
there is sufficient depth of hierarchy in this division
that if future openings could be awarded to non-ethos-wedded
managers, considerable inroads could be made. The best
example of this is the ADC of MIS, who feels the immobility
of the civil service can be overcome by perseverance as he
was successful in creating a new civil service class job
within his division - although it took eighteen months and
was greeted at first with "couldn't be done" pessimism.
As valuable as the concept of a change agent is, there
is still the necessity for a strategy for managing change.
A number of researchers and practitioners have adopted the
Lewin-Schein model of change (Unfreezing-*Changing-+Refreezing)
as a basic tenet of behavioral and organizational change,
and have elaborated upon it. One particular model with
widespread appeal is due to Kolb and Frohman(8). Like Lewin
and Schein, Kolb and Frohman argue that effective organiza-
tional change involves working through a series of stages.
In Figure 9 we present a variant of the Kolb-Frohman
model which we believe highlights the most important stages
for the current case, and is similar in spirit to the ap-
proach advocated by Keen and Scott Morton(7) for the iter-
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Figure 9
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ative design of decision support systems. The various steps
in the process are identified at the right with the stages
in the Kolb-Frohman model. Examining the left side we see
that it is essentially that discussed in Chapter 3. It is
concerned with the more rational elements of the decision
to be implemented; however, the political and behavioral
perspectives developed in treading the right-hand steps
are just as important if an effective choice is to be made
and carried to fruition.
It must also be borne in mind that many interactions
or feed-back loops occur in following the strategy through
to its completion. Thus the procedure for arriving at a
centralization/decentralization configuration given in
Chapter 3 does include organizational considerations such
as degree of commitment, although from a point of view of
designing the configuration, not implementation of a design.
A further example includes the generation of the alternatives
actually to be considered from the interaction of the avail-
able resources and the feasible solutions. In other words,
although a certain course of action or decision may be in-
dicated as acceptable by an ideal view of the world, it may
not be admitted to the final alternatives to be chosen from
because of the extremely high cost of the resources involved,
say, or some other "real-world" constraint.
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The steps on the right side are largely self-explana-
tory, but nonetheless point out the deficiencies in the
city's attempt at consolidation. For example no one has
bothered to gauge the commitment of those who would be most
involved in a centralized system either as user or servicer.
Otherwise, given the general lack of commitment which exists,
active steps could be taken to either proselytize them to
the plan or abandon it, instead of orphaning it and leaving
the individual groups to accept or reject it on the merits
they perceive in it. A range of empirical studies imply
that for a successful entry stage, involved parties must
have a motive and commitment for action. Similarly, no
one has explicitly stated what the objectives of the present
plan are. One person likened the consolidation plan to
setting off on a cross-country trip with no road map and
no idea what the destination is. Ostensibly the broad ob-
jective is to save money (most plans are). But how much?
Over what time interval? Has any one thought (other than
H&H's MIS) of possible savings in clerical personnel? And
as Appendix C demonstrates, departments without DP capability
are developing systems - what can be done to integrate these?
In any case, as Figure 9 implies, these early steps also
provide the basis for evaluation. There must be some cri-
teria for "success" and some indicators with which to measure
progress and accomplishment. Priorities and tradeoffs must
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be established in order to reach a final decision. Evalua-
tion cannot be after-the-fact for, to continue the above
simile, unless one knows where he is headed, he cannot
know when he has arrived. Finally, the identification of
resources available must be concerned with uncovering lack
of resources as well. Such an examination, if it had been
undertaken, would have revealed the unpreparedness of most
of the DP groups for consolidation. As an example in addi-
tion to previous ones, we may mention the extent of the
Police DP plan. It consisted of little more than changing
their applications from DOS to OS and converting their
sequential-on-tape files (all DP groups are primarily tape-
based) to sequential-on-disk! When the RJE arrived, a great
deal of on-the-fly learning had to be suffered through in
order to find out how to run a remote facility.
We need to make two further comments regarding Figure
9. First, as may be surmised from the discussion so far,
the step labeled "implement choice" cannot narrowly be
thought of as a single act, but rather as interactive and
inseparable with most of the previous steps. Second, there
is no-termination phase associated with our process. If
we accept the rationale of Chapter 3, then there is no all-
encompassing, single centralization/decentralization to be
made. Instead we can repeat the cycle as often as desired
(re-evaluating old LAGs or examining new ones for instance)
-82-
thereby maintaining the flexibility in our information
systems and establishing as a standard operating procedure
the incremental approach to change which we advocate.
Summary
In the last two chapters we have traced the city's
plan for consolidation and pointed out what we feel was
lacking in the decision. Our analysis in Chapter 3 of
specific DP departments combined with the view of the
civil service of this chapter indicates that strong central-
ization of either systems management, development or opera-
tions is impossible. Even the faltering few steps the
consolidation plan is making toward centralized operations
is at variance with the trend towards minis and external
time-sharing in some of the departments. If centralization
were to have a modicum of success, a new DP department
would probably have to be established to avoid thorny
political questions and accusations of empire-building.
Instead, by means of our study of C/D factors we concluded
that almost certainly management and development (and in
certain applications, operations) should reside with the
departments. Centralized operations can result in savings
and increased efficiency, but only if Central DP will take
more seriously its newly developing role as a resource of
technical and production capability at the disposal of users.
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We have argued that for any changes attempted on a
structure as interested in maintaining the status quo as
the city bureaucracy, careful thought must be given to
the change process itself. Therefore the cycle of Figure
9 must become institutionalized as part of the operating
procedures of the DP units or their parent departments.
In order for this to happen, there must be a guiding and
motivating force, and this may be supplied by means of
change agents. Given the bureaucratic behavioral norms,
the department commissioners seem the best choice. If
we recall the example of Connecticut General we realize
that forming a senior EDP steering committee to review
lower-level decisions and challenge them as necessary can
be a palatable alternative to centralized management yet
still accomplish what we require. By a coordination of
activities and the setting up of standards we would allow
movement between DP groups, greater upward mobility and the
sharing of knowledge, resources, development of systems,
etc. Inexorably more departments will become dependent
on data processing and to a greater degree. The steering
committee itself will therefore change with time.
Additionally we require the commitment of the DP manag-
ers to such goals. Unfortunately such attitudes are scarce
within the city as yet. A possible solution to this dilemma
is to look outside the civil service ranks, as has been done
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in some instances, for suitable talent. These DP heads
must, of course, heavily interact with the steering commit-
tee, perhaps in an advisory status.
The idea of a committee has been tried, with the Collec-
tor-Treasurer, head of OMB and the DDP of AS as members.
It met several times last fall, but not this year as the
DDP stopped attending. In light of what we have discussed,
we would argue that the composition was wrong. Matching
a veteran civil servant with two who are not could only
lead to.frustration, and also the group was too narrowly
populated to deal with the inter-departmental issues which
the C/D question raises. If the committee were to function
in a senior review capacity, other commissioners with large
DP budgets would have to be included. If the committee was
intended to facilitate consolidation then certainly the
DP heads should have been members instead of the Collector-
Treasurer and OMB, as the latter have little authority over
the other units. The weak link so to speak, would still
be the DDP who, while not opposed to increasing the capacity
of his own unit, has shown a lack of enthusiasm and commit-
ment to extending his responsibility with consolidation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
If consolidation proceeds, there is considerable doubt
as to the effectiveness of the result. Because it is ef-
fectiveness for which we should be striving we have argued
in favor of examining individual data processing needs to
determine an effective way of supporting them. Neither
advancing technology (and the concomitant cost changes)
nor organizational constraints alone should drive the deci-
sion, but rather their intersection. The CISR model has
proven to be useful in pointing out and structuring the
diverse factors involved, though it addresses only the
making of the decision not its implementation.
Let us reflect upon what we have found in order to
summarize our overall recommendations.
- Centralization can result in significant cost
reductions, but so can other means, and without
the risk of seriously deteriorating effectiveness.
Gibson and Nolan(4) and others argue that centralization
is one of the stages through which the DP function passes
as it matures. It usually arises as a reaction to a runa-
way budget and therefore is characterized by a proliferation
of controls, formal priority setting and budget justifica-
tion. We have seen that existing conditions and attitudes
among employees and supervisors run counter to such control.
There do not exist the most basic of standards such as
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requiring only COBOL at all data processing units, yet at
the same time the attempt is being made to implement more
complex (for the city) processing and data management tech-
niques.
A further obstacle to the evaluation of any alternative
is the municipal budget design. In addition to the difficulty
of extracting budgetary data for each DP unit, it shares
the traditional weakness of government budgets: it is an
instrument for the control of spending. It was not designed
to assist analysis, planning and decision-making. Tied
closely with the design is the attitude that what was spent
in a particular area in the previous year will be forthcom-
ing in the following year plus an increase dependent on
various factors. The main focus of the supervisor's ener-
gies will therefore be to secure at least his old budget
and he will strongly resist any cut-backs. This is incre-o
mental budgeting and for the School Department is has legal
status. The converse is zero-based budgeting which is
looked upon as an anathema by government bureaucrats. The
kernel of zero-based budgeting however, is the valid need
to expose more of the expenditures to systematic scrutiny
on a continuing basis in order to determine the extent to
which objectives are being met. The present method, with
its after-the-fact adjustments, is incapable of this; at
the very least an external audit of each department's data
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processing operations should be carried out as has been
done for Health and Hospitals.
We began by stressing the need for a continuously
evolving planning process. We have found for the city
that:
- the idea of centralization was decided upon
narrowly and virtually institutionalized be-
fore the more recent turnabouts in hardware
and teleprocessing. Moreover, it was endorsed
with very little knowledge of what AS-DP was
capable of or motivated towards.
In spite of the freezing of the official plan, we find indi-
vidual departments engaged in developing their own specific
systems thereby maintaining decentralization. The movement
outwards towards more direct availability of service to
users with some of these systems (which will increase as
the city becomes more sophisticated in its use of computers)
therefore argues against pulling these facilities farther
from their local setting.
Also, while those applications whose efficiency can be
improved should be moved to Central DP, we must realize
that the thrust of Management Information Systems today is
to find new ways of making better use of existing informa-
tion systems. Transaction processing is important but
routine. New systems have in mind management query of the
information system without requiring specialized computer
training. Much local knowledge is required by systems de-
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velopers to attain this. One simple concept which the city
has missed is that of locality of data. There is much in-
formation that is not required on the city level and ought
to remain local, such as patient scheduling for a specific
hospital, etc. Departments may oppose exposing some infor-
mation such as that for appropriations and expenditures.
In general we found:
- the present movement toward centralization is
completely lacking in coherent and rational
planning as to what is desired and how this
will be achieved.
Our three criteria for improving decisions are unmet. The
city has not clearly defined what the goals of consolidation
are. City operating procedures and behavioral norms render
it unable to judge the effectiveness of current programs.
And alternatives are not being considered, though without
well-defined goals it is difficult to determine alternatives.
In light of our examination of applications and the
overall organizational structure, attitudes and behavior
we feel,
- there are strong arguments in favor of main-
taining decentralization at least of manage-
ment, development and some operations.
- there is a critical need for the development
of a roadmap for DP development with perhaps
3-5 year plans for each department. These
would be developed by the departments, but
there would be great usefulness in instituting
a senior EDP committee to review and advise them.
- careful attention must be paid to the climate
the city presents for change.
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- there is a need to locate and recruit EDP
managerial talent from outside the civil
service if effective changes are to be made
(at least until the bureaucratic ethos is
no longer strong).
The need to improve personnel is an important one and we
have merely touched the tip of a very large iceberg. At
least one major study by the Brookings Institution(16) con-
siders how to improve professional, technical and managerial
personnel for New York City. It covers all aspects including
recruitment, selection, promotion and training processes,
and suggests changes for New York State's civil service
law. Some of its recommendations, however, cannot be quick-
ly and easily implemented; only a major crisis could provide
the impetus for some of them. In the immediate and moderate
term our more modest approach at change will have a greater
chance for success, but the city's long-term view should be
directed towards such overhauls of the civil service.
In examining all of the factors at work among the city
DP groups, the dominant one appears to be the lackadaisical
support of the DDP for centralization. Were he to be firmly
committed to the idea then most practical obstacles to it
could be overcome, whether or not a centralized scheme was
the one pointed to by our decision-model. There may be many
contributing reasons for his attitude. One is his concep-
tion of the "business" or responsibilities of his group: he
perceives it on a more limited scale than does the Collector-
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Treasurer and others. The city originally conceived of
consolidation as a means of saving money on hardware and
people, but the DDP is really not interested in taking over
systems development or management. The bureaucratic model
would argue by rule six that he is interested in performing
only the minimal activities required. Or the feeling ad-
vanced by one official may be closer to the truth: "if I
were Bud Flanagan and faced the problems looming in the
near future, I'd be very frightened". Fear may be prevent-
ing the DDP from extending his responsibilities, and the
consolidation effort suffers as a consequence.
Assuming no changes at all, if forced to predict the
future evolution of the city consolidation plan it would
be this: there will be further hardware consolidations,
but they will involve slow and painfully difficult learn-
ing processes. No savings will occur however, because
the separate DP units will remain intact. They will remain
so out of their own desire for self-preservation, the need
for local systems development which Central DP is unwilling
to provide, and because there will be further development
of minicomputer-based systems as identification of applica-
tions are made (Supervisors will rush funds freed elsewhere
to these systems for reasons we have discussed). The city
will, by costly trial and error, find out that some things
are better centralized and some decentralized.
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APPENDIX A
Survey of Data Processing Hardware,
Software and Personnel
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A.l Administrative Services DP
HARDWARE
IBM
370/145 CPU w/2MB Core
Printer (1403-N01)
Terminal (274 1-001)
Display Station(3275-002)
Display Station(3277-002)
Disk Storage(3330-ll)
Disk Storage(3333-11)
Tape Drive(3420-005)
Data Station(3742-001)
Communication Terminal(3775-POl)
Card Punch(0029-A22)
Collator (0188-A28)
Card Unit(2540-001)
Control Unit(2821)
Control Unit(3272)
Control Unit(3705)
Storage Control(3830)
+ other eqtipment
$1,230,827/year
Computer Optics Inc.
4 Printer(7780-2)
2 480 CRT(8277-1)
12 1920 CRT(8277-2)
6 Data Entry
Keyboards(8631)
7 78 Key
Typewriter(8633)
2 Light Pen(7350)
+ other equipment
#39264/year
TOTAL Annual Charges $1,270,091
SOFTWARE
IBM Non-IBM
C6bal Prompter
Assembler Prompter
Fortran Prompter
TSO Data Utilities
TSO Structured Program Facility
TSO Command Processor
Cobol Debug
Fortran IV Gl Compiler
Fortran Library
Fortran Debug
Math Basic
Statistical Basic
Business Analysis Basic
CICS/VS
Fast Dump/Restore
Plan IV
Librarian
Syncsort V
SPSS
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1
3
23
3
18
9
3
8
12
2
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
A.l (Continued)
IMS/VS
Cobol/VS
VS Basic
TOTAL Annual Charges $63,924
PERSONNEL
1 Data Processing Services Director
1 Principal DP Systems Analyst
2 Senior DP Systems Analyst
1 Manager Data Processing
5 DP Systems Analyst
2 Principal Programmers
1 Assistant Manager DP
4 Senior Programmers
1 Manager Statistical Machine Operators
2 Supervisor Statistical Machine Operators
1 Supervisor SMO & Vital Statistics
1 Senior Accountant
3 Senior Computer Operators
1 Computer Operator
1 Assistant Supervisor SMO
3 Head Clerk
1 Office Appliance Maintenance Man
7 Principal Statistical Machine Operator
6 Senior SMO
7 Statistical Machine Operator
TOTAL Personnel 51
TOTAL Annual Expenditures $721,406
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A.2 Health & Hospitals Management Info. Services
HARDWARE
IBM
370/125 CPU
Printer(1403)
Disk Storage & Control(3330)
Disk Storage(3333)
Tape Drive(3410)
Tape Drive & Control(3411)
Card Reader(3504)
Key Punch(029)
+ other equipment
$153,840/year
INFOREX
Key to Disk Equipment
1 Control Unit(1303)
1 Tape Drive (1303-1106)
11 Key Stations(2901)
+ other equipment
$21,720/year
DEC
DEC System 20/40 CPU
Disk Drive(RPO4)
Tape Drive(TUl6)
Console Terminal (LA36)
Line Printer(LP20)
Asynchronous Lines(DC20-EA)
DECscope Advanced CRT(VT52)
Hardcopy Terminals(LA36-EE)
Programmable Data Logger(PDlll-BA)
Auto Analyzer Interfaces(CC55)
+other equipment
Maintenance by DEC
$57,420/year
Owned by Department of Health & Hospitals
TOTAL Annual Charges $232,980
SOFTWARE
IBM DEC
Primary Software Compiler
Full DOS-VS ANS Cobol
and Library
DOS-VS Sort Merge
DOS Patient Registration
OS Patient Registration
DOS Admitting System
TOPS-20 Operating System
SOS/Runoff Text Processing
Cobol 20 Compiler
Basic 20 Compiler
Fortran 20 Compiler
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1
10
1
1
15
16
10
4
2
15
A.2 (Continued)
OS Admitting System WESTINGHOUSE
DOS Patient Appointment System JOB Accounting
Most of above owned by Department of Health & Hospitals
TOTAL Annual Charges $32,508 for maintenance
PERSONNEL
1 Assistant Deputy Commissioner
1 Assistant Manager DP
1 Manager DP
3 DP'-Systems Analyst
1 Senior DP Systems Analyst
1 Senior Medical Info. Systems Analyst
1 Senior Software Systems Programmer
1 Principal Programmer
2 Principal DP Systems Analyst
1 Senior Computer Operator
1 Computer Operator
2 Senior Programmer
3 Supervisor Statistical Machine Operators
2 Assistant Supervisor SMO
3 Principal Statistical Machine Operator
5 Senior SMO
8 Statistical Machine Operator
TOTAL Personnel 37
TOTAL Annual Expenditure $510,346
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A.3 Police DP
HARDWARE
IBM Data General
370/135 CPU
Card Punch(0029)
Printer(1403)
Data Recorder(0129)
Disk Pack(2316)
Disk Storage(2319)
Card Unit(2540)
Display Station(3277)
Data Converter(3747)
Tape Control(3803)
Tape Drive(3420)
Data Station(3742)
+ other equipment
$320,352
TOTAL Annual Charges $362,772
SOFTWARE (non-owned)
IBM
CICS-DOS/Entry
Cobol ANS Library
Cobol ANS-VS DOS
TOTAL Annual Charges $3840
PERSONNEL
Civilian
1 Director DP
2 Senior DP Systems Analyst
1 Head Clerk
2 DP Systems Analyst
1 Senior Computer Operator
4 Computer Operator
1 Computer Programmer
1 Tape Librarian
1 Jr. Clerk Typist
2 Principal Statistical Machine OF
2 Eclipse S/200 w/32KB
2 131KB Memory(8445)
39 Video Displays(6012C)
4 Disk Control(4046)
4 Disk Drives(4057A)
6 Disk Pack(4057B)
2 Line Printer(4034G)
+ other equipment
Annual Servicing by
Data General including
Software $42,420
(owned by Police Dept.)
Police
1 Mgr. Computer Operations
1 Computer Operator
3 Programmer/Analyst
2 Crime Statisticians
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A.3 (Continued)
4 Senior SMO
12 Statistical Machine Operator
TOTAL Personnel (civilian) 32
TOTAL Annual Expenditures (civilian) $315,549
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A.4 Schools DP
HARDWARE
IBM
1 370/125 CPU
3 Disk Storage(3330)
5 Tape Drive(3410)
1 Card Reader
1 Printer(1404-N01)
1 Optical Reader(3881)
7 Data Recorder(0129)
+ other equipment
TOTAL Annual Charges $210,300
SOFTWARE
IBM
EPIC-Socrates
DL/I DOS-VS
ANS Cobol
DOS-VS Sort/Merge
TOTAL Annual Charges $7992
PERSONNEL
1 Director DP
1 Acting Assistant Director
2 Systems Analyst
1 Systems Programmer
2 Programmer
1 Junior Programmer
1 Operations Supervisor
3 Computer Operator
1 Data Entry Supervisor
6 Statistical Machine Operators
TOTAL Personnel 19
TOTAL Annual Expenditures $278,000
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A.5 Library DP
HARDWARE
IBM
1 360/20 CPU
1 Tape Drive (2415-5)
1 Card Reader(2501-AO1)
1 Card Unit(2560-AO1)
1 Sorter(0084-001)
6 Data Recorder(0129-003)
8 Input Station(1031)
2 Card Punch(1034-001)
1 Printer(1403-N01)
TOTAL Annual Charges $110,904
Outside Contractual Service: MARC II Catalog Products&Services
Cataloging
Record Processing/Preparation
On-Line Data Entry/Editing
Terminals
Catalog Cards,Spine Labels
Optional Programming
+ other products and services
Vendor: Inforonics Inc.
TOTAL Annual Charges $70,000
PERSONNEL
1 Assistant to Director for Systems & DP
1 DP Supervisor
2 Computer Operators
2 Senior Statistical Machine Operators
4 Statistical Machine Operators
TOTAL Personnel 10
TOTAL Expenditures $111,607
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A.6 Collector-Treasurer DP
HARDWARE
UNIVAC
#9200 Processor w/8KB
Verify/Interpret. Key
Electronic Sorter
Card Punch/Stacker
Storage
Punch
TOTAL Annual Charges $41,064
PERSONNEL
1 Manager of Statistical Machine Operators
2 Computer Operators
1 Principal Statistical Machine Operator
9 Senior SMO
4 Statistical Machine Operator
TOTAL Personnel 17
TOTAL Annual Expenditures $164,520
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A.7 Assessing DP
HARDWARE
TOTAL Annual Charges $19,000
PERSONNEL
1 DP Project Manager
1 DP Information Manager
1 Senior Computer Operator
1 Computer :Operator
3 Assistant Supervisor Statistical Machine Operators
5 Principal Clerk - SMO
3 Senior SMO
2 Statistical Machine Operator
1 Office Appliance Maintenance Man
TOTAL Personnel 18
TOTAL Annual Expenditures $219,826
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APPENDIX B
Partial Listing of Applications
for Departments of
Schools, Police, Health & Hospitals
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RECENT EDP CONSULTING SERVICES
Vendor
FY 1975-76
ADL Systems Inc.
Julian R. McDermott
Clasby Associates
Police
Rent Control
Fire
OPS/Election
Admin.
Services
Computer-Aided
Dispatch System
$609K
Computer System 72K
Development
Compuer-Aided
Fire Alarm System
Annual Resident
List
Consulting on
Consolidation
36K
24K
97K
FY 1976-77
Arthur Anderson
& Co.
Scientific Time
Sharing Corp.
Keane Associates
Julian R. McDermott
Clasby Associates
John M. Meyers
Community
Development
Community
Developmt.
Public
Facilities
Rent Control
Admin. Serv.
Commerce &
Manpower
Treasury
Autom. Financl.
Mgt. System
& Consultg. Serv.
Time-Sharing
Services
Consultg. Serv.
& Capital Improvemt.
Prog. Data Base
Computer System
Development
Annual Resident
List
309K
30K
62K
72K
26K
Mgt. Info System 15K
Development
Consulting 28K
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Dept. Purpose Cost
APPENDIX D
Current Configuration 370/158
Administrative Services DP Unit
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